EP0140013A2
Expired / Lapsed
EP
⏱️ 0.0 years remaining
Improvements in point of sale and electronic funds transfer systems
Assignee: IBM Deutschland GmbH
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Filing: 1984-08-29
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Granted: —
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Expires: 2004-08-29
Abstract
Abstract @ An electronic funds transfer system (EFT) is described in which retail terminals located in stores are connected through a public switched telecommunication system to card issuing agencies data processing centres. Users of the system are issued with intelligent secure bank cards, which include a microprocessor, ROS and RAM stores. The ROS includes a personal key (KP) and an account number (PAN) stored on the card when the issuer issues it to the user. Users also have a personal identity number (PIN) which is stored or remembered separately. A transaction is initiated at a retail terminal when a card is inserted in an EFT module connected to the terminal. A request message including the PAN and a session key (KS) is transmitted to the issuers data processing centre. The issuer generates an authentication parameter (TAP) based upon its stored version of KP and PIN and a time variant parameter received from the terminal. The TAP is then returned to the terminal in a response message, and based upon an inputed ./... PIN, partial processing of the input PIN and KP on the card a derived TAP is compared with the received TAP in the terminal. A correct comparison indicating that the entered PIN is valid. The request message includes the PAN encoded under the KS and KS encoded under a cross-domain key. Message authentication codes (MAC) are attached to each message and the correct reception and regeneration of a MAC on a message including a term encoded under KS indicates that the received KS is valid and that the message originated at a valid terminal or card.
Inventors
- 👤 Bruno Brachtl
- 👤 Christopher J. Holloway
- 👤 Richard Edward Lennon
- 👤 Stephen Michael Matyas
- 👤 Carl Heinz-Wilhelm Meyer
- 👤 Jonathan Oseas
Bibliographic Details
Application Number
—
Jurisdiction
EP
Data Source
google_patents
Last Synchronized
2026-11-07 23:31
CPC Classifications
G; G07; G07F; G07F7/00; G07F7/08; G07F7/10; G07F7/1008; G06; G06Q; G06Q20/00; G06Q20/08; G06Q20/085; G06Q20/0855; G06Q20/20; G06Q20/30; G06Q20/34; G06Q20/341; G06Q20/38; G06Q20/382; G06Q20/3829; G06Q20/40; G06Q20/409; G06Q20/4097; G07F7/1016
Claims Analysis
Total Claims: 4
Claim 1
Independent Claim
324 words
An electronic funds transfer system in which EFT terminals are connected through a local data processing centre (acquirer) to a public switch system (switch), a plurality of card-issuing agencies' data processing centres are also connected to the public switch system and each user of the EFT system has a personal secure intelligent bank card on which is stored a personal account number (PAN) and a personal key (KP), the system including means at each local data processing centre to generate session keys (KS) for each of its locally attached terminals, and to transmit an associated session key to a respective terminal, at each terminal means to store the session key, means to encipher sensitive data (PAN) under the session key whenever a transaction request message is generated, means to generate a transaction variable for each transaction initiated at the terminal and to transfer the transaction variable to the card, means to transfer a message request including the transaction variable enciphered under KS to the users card and means on the card to generate a message authentication code using a time-variant key (KSTR1) based upon-the users PAN, KP and the transaction variable, means at each local data processing centre to encipher the appropriate session key under a cross-domain key whenever a transaction request message is received and to add the enciphered key to the message, means at each processing node of the public switch system to translate the enciphered session key from encipherment under a received cross-domain key to a transmission cross-domain key, means at the card issuing agency's data processing centre to decipher the enciphered session key and to use the key to decipher any sensitive data contained in the request message, and means to regenerate the message authentication code using the time variant key (KSTR1) which is generated from parameters based upon the PAN and KP and the received transaction variable for comparison with the message authentication code included in the received message.
Claim 2
Dependent Claim
324 words
An electronic funds transfer system in which EFT terminals are connected through a local data processing centre (acquirer) to a public switch system (switch), a plurality of card-issuing agencies' data processing centres are also connected to the public switch system and each user of the EFT system has a personal secure intelligent bank card on which is stored a personal account number (PAN) and a personal key (KP), the system including means at each local data processing centre to generate session keys (KS) for each of its locally attached terminals, and to transmit an associated session key to a respective terminal, at each terminal means to store the session key, means to encipher sensitive data (PAN) under the session key whenever a transaction request message is generated, means to generate a transaction variable for each transaction initiated at the terminal and to transfer the transaction variable to the card, means to transfer a message request including the transaction variable enciphered under KS to the users card and means on the card to generate a message authentication code using a time-variant key (KSTR1) based upon-the users PAN, KP and the transaction variable, means at each local data processing centre to encipher the appropriate session key under a cross-domain key whenever a transaction request message is received and to add the enciphered key to the message, means at each processing node of the public switch system to translate the enciphered session key from encipherment under a received cross-domain key to a transmission cross-domain key, means at the card issuing agency's data processing centre to decipher the enciphered session key and to use the key to decipher any sensitive data contained in the request message, and means to regenerate the message authentication code using the time variant key (KSTR1) which is generated from parameters based upon the PAN and KP and the received transaction variable for comparison with the message authentication code included in the received message.
Claim 3
Dependent Claim
309 words
2 . An electronic funds transfer system in which EFT terminals are connectable through a local data processing centre (acquirer) through a public switch network (switch), to a plurality of card issuing agencies' data processing centres and each user of the system has a personal secure intelligent bank card on which is stored a personal account number (PAN) and a personal key (KP), means at the card and terminal for each transaction initiated at the terminal to generate a first transaction variable (Tterm,card) and to include the first transaction variable in a transaction message request sent to the c.i.a. data processing centre, the system also including at the c.i.a. data processing centres, means to construct a response message to each transaction request message received, each positive response message including a first portion (CTR) on which a first message authentication code is generated using a key derived from the first transaction variable, the user's personal key and personal account number, and a second portion including the first portion on which a second message authentication code is generated using as an encipher key a random or pseudo-random number and means to encipher the random number key under a cross-domain key and to add the enciphered key to response message, means at the terminal to receive the response message and to decipher the random number key, to use the deciphered key to recreate a message authentication code based upon the second portion of the received message and to compare the recreated message authentication code with the received second message authentication code, means at the card to use the first transaction variable, the personal key and the personal account number to derive an encipher key to generate a message authentication code on the first portion of the message and to compare the recreated message authentication code with the received first message authentication code.
Claim 4
Dependent Claim
309 words
2 . An electronic funds transfer system in which EFT terminals are connectable through a local data processing centre (acquirer) through a public switch network (switch), to a plurality of card issuing agencies' data processing centres and each user of the system has a personal secure intelligent bank card on which is stored a personal account number (PAN) and a personal key (KP), means at the card and terminal for each transaction initiated at the terminal to generate a first transaction variable (Tterm,card) and to include the first transaction variable in a transaction message request sent to the c.i.a. data processing centre, the system also including at the c.i.a. data processing centres, means to construct a response message to each transaction request message received, each positive response message including a first portion (CTR) on which a first message authentication code is generated using a key derived from the first transaction variable, the user's personal key and personal account number, and a second portion including the first portion on which a second message authentication code is generated using as an encipher key a random or pseudo-random number and means to encipher the random number key under a cross-domain key and to add the enciphered key to response message, means at the terminal to receive the response message and to decipher the random number key, to use the deciphered key to recreate a message authentication code based upon the second portion of the received message and to compare the recreated message authentication code with the received second message authentication code, means at the card to use the first transaction variable, the personal key and the personal account number to derive an encipher key to generate a message authentication code on the first portion of the message and to compare the recreated message authentication code with the received first message authentication code.
References Cited (Backward Citations)
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